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Argeus the Paladin -> Academic - Game Theory - Why Do Girls always go out with Jerk Guys? (8/22/2008 3:18:43)
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Hi there everyone! Argeus speaking here on a new piece of work. This is going to be kind of an academic journal article that I write for the purpose of fun and game, and for submission to my school's Micro lecturer. It may contain disturbing language (de facto, et.al, de jure, and those along the lines) as well as contents not suitable for minors (Because game theory is part of post graduate curriculum). Those deemed too innocent (i.e. not being in college or last years at hgh school), be warned. Also, this assessment is not fully scientific, so don't treat it as a serious research or something. (Hey, I am a 17 year old first year, not a 70 year old scholar! *points to the picture of Professor Manning Clark in the lecture theatre*). Ready? Set? Enjoy.
Edit: The Glossary is added for the benefit of those who would not like to involve themselves in disturbing languages or contents not suitable for minors.
Why Girls always go out with Jerk Guys?
A Question by Orochi Paladin
Critical Analysis by Argeus the Paladin
for the Battleon Legends and Lore Scientific Journal,
22nd August 2008
The Controversy
The topic of "Why girls always go out with jerk guys" (Orochi Paladin, 2008) have been under a lot of debate ever since a particular, sizable portion of the teen population started discussing it. For once, it has been attracting a number of highly discontented teenagers who has not been able to find their dream lady. For the other, it is observed that the conflicting interest of the "nerd", described by Wiktionary as "a person who, although having good technical or scientific skills, is introspective and generally introverted", and the "jerk", described as "A person with unlikable qualities and behavior, typically mean, self-centered or disagreeable, and often not very intelligent.", has escalated throughout the evolution of the modern society.
Argeus, Gwoonjustin and Sporkgoddess (2008) has explicitly disagreed with Orochi's reasoning. The given reason ranged from the over-generalization stated in Orochi Paladin's article, to the lack of clear disambiguation of the word "jerk". While in a linguistic context, this would prove to be an excellent argument, but in terms of Game Theory, for the ease of the article, the proposed definition of "jerk" is being the male counterpart of the "Popular Girl" stock character model, which reads,
A Jerk is a popular boy in high school, who meets at least two of the following criteria including the last: Has a wealthy background, has a highly and often overly stylish lifestyle, but has a very self-centered personality and who is not as intelligent as his peers, i.e not usually getting marks in exam higher than the median value
The Game
So how can this be explained in terms of Game Theory? The Game Theory here deals with a new variation of the Prisoners' Dilemma, with two players and a kingmaker.
The story opens as such: In a class, there are two "nerds", A and B, who, for some reasons, both pursue a single girl, D. D is a "conventional" high school girl- that means she doesn't nurture a liking for nerdy boys, but if given the right amount of flirting, could choose to go out with one. In the class, there is also a "jerk", C, who fulfills all the criteria for a "jerk" as stated in the proposition above. Naturally, as a Jerk, he is much less intelligent than A or B, but is basically a ladies' magnet. He wouldn't much care if he gets another girl to go out with him, so he would get roughly zero utility from going out with D. In other words, he would have no incentive to actively flirt D, except for fun.
The war of love has been going on for the whole year, and the decisive time is coming- final exam time. A and B is thusly faced with a choice: They can either study for the best, or go on to flirt the girl. If they study, due to their intellect, they would get a HIGH DISTINCTION, without doubt, while the girl, bored, would go out with the jerk C. If they keep flirting the girl, they would barely PASS the exam. If either A or B flirts the girl, while the other study, the flirter will get the girl's hand and a PASS grade, and the learner will get HD. However, if both choose to flirt the girl, being confused by their action, D would go out with C, while the two loverboyish A and B would get a PASS.
This is where this game is different from the standard Prisoners' Dilemma. At his own discretion, C would choose to enter the love war, just for kicks. In that case, regardless of A and B's choice, C would go out with the girl, while any of those loverboy, A and B, would FAIL the exam owing to lovesickness if they choose to fight for the lost cause. Because, as stated above, C gets no utility from flirting and going out with D, his chance of intervening and not intervening is equal- at 50%.
Both A and B don't know what his opponent and the bystander C is planning. What should A and B do to maximize their earning i.e. final exam score and get the girl's hand in a date? We will make the assumption that both A and B are homo economicus and that they value the girl and their academic achievement equally high.
(I cannot insert the payoff matrix due to a lack of computer know-how. My apology)
Clearly enough, the game mechanism is almost the same as the Prisoners' Dilemma if it is not the case that the jerk C chooses to intervene. The dominant strategy of both A and B is to go on to flirt the girl and hope that the other does not. Because of that, it is likely that both would go out full-speed for the fair lady, sacrificing their High Distinction. Doing so, unfortunately, would make both fail at both the girl and getting a high score. However, the Nash Equilibrium in this case is not as strong as that in the standard PD case, as there is still some incentive for either A or B to change their decision. Given that the time is long enough, either A or B would try the Brinkmanship strategy- that is, in case both appear to go for the girl, either would wait and hope that the other would back off, as they both value their academic achievement as much as D.
Now, what if the jerk C enters the fray? Assume that C enters to his own discretion- that is, both A and B wouldn't know of C's entrance until they see the girl go out with him. Furthermore, as discussed above, this takes place exactly 50% of the time. Note that even if C enters and wins the girl, he doesn't win the game. In that case, there is one de jure winner and two de facto losers, making C essentially a Kingmaker. If C enters, the chance of both A and B losing painfully is 100% exactly. If he does not, it is a Prisoners' Dilemma. In that case, what should A and B do?
In that case, the game would change totally. Because both A and B value the girl and their academic record equally, and because persistence in the love war may give them nothing at all, they would both choose to bury themselves in their study and put all their hopes in the upcoming exam. This is where the Nash Equilibrium is set up- Neither A nor B has the incentive to change their dominant behavior i.e. keep learning. The result is, if A and B are homo economicus and value the girl and their studies equally, C will end up winning her in all cases.
Conclusion: Any chance for the nerd?
The above Game Theory reasoning shows that, in most scenarios with a jerk in pursuit of a lady in class, there is minimal chance for the others, especially the nerd. Therefore, conclusively, for most of the girls classified as "normal high school girls" with a taste for "kool" boys, the nerd would stand no chance to win over the jerk. Even if A and B weren't homo economicus, their parents would know when to intervene, and the parents, on the contrary, are always the more rational thinkers.
The question here is, does the nerd have any chance in such a conflict? Contrary to popular belief, if the game follows the above rules with some variation, the chance of either nerd would be significantly raised or reduced by means of information asymmetry exploitation. As stated, as C does not gain utility from going out with D- unfortunately, D doesn't know this- he could maximize his utility by means other than flirting with D. Hereby, the dominant choice that each party would make would present a Pareto Suboptimal choice for all parties concerned. Either A or B could exploit this, according to the Coase Theorem, resulting in an optimal outcome for both the exploiter and C.
If either player is able to exploit the information asymetry, the game would once again change- C would become a player and a winner (because he reaps some kind of benefit from the Pareto-improving option that either A or B may present), and either A or B would win, while the other and the poor girl D would lose.
In conclusion, the answer to Orochi Paladin's question is that, being a "jerk" does not automatically make a high schooler a winner in a conflict of love, and being a nerd doesn't automatically mean failure. It is how the parties involved make use of game theory to solve the conflict that matters.
Glossary
Brinkmanship Strategy: A strategy in a two-player game in which each would increasingly escalate his threat towards the other, in the hope that the other would back down. However, if none backs down, the outcome would be the worst for both parties. An example is two car drivers going full-speed in opposite direction on a one-lane road, each hoping that the other would swerve, but if neither does, the result would be a full-fledged crash that would invariably kill both.
Coase Theorem: A theorem that states that when trade in an externality is possible and there are no transaction costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights
Dominant strategy: A strategy in a particular game which is better than all the other for the player, regardless of the other player's choice.
Game Theory: A branch of applied mathematics that attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others.
Homo Economicus: Reasonable/Rational Human. In a Game Theory sense, this means that a person would seek to maximize his outcome by all means i.e. go for the choice that reaps the maximum benefit for himself.
Information Asymetry: A particular case in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance of power in transactions which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry, or totally change the expected outcome.
Kingmaker: A person involved in a game, either a non-player or who cannot win, but has power to influence the outcome of the game based on his course of action.
Nash Equilibrium: A strategic point in Game Theory at which neither player has the incentive to change his dominant strategy.
Pareto Optimal Point: A point in economic transaction at which it is impossible to increase the benefit of one party without harming the other party.
Pareto-improving Transaction: A transaction involving two parties that would increase the benefit of one party without harming the other.
Prisoners' Dilemma: A non-zero-sum two-player "game" in which each player following his dominant strategy would lead to a non-favorable outcome for both. The "original" PD was as such:
quote:
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies ("defects") for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act?
Utility: A (subjective) measurement of satisfaction that a consumer would gain by consuming a particular amount of a particular good, or a person would gain by following a particular course of action.
Reference
- Orochi Paladin, Why do girls always go out with Jerk guys, added on by Sporkgoddess, Gwoonjustin, Flame Master Axel and Argeus the Paladin, June 2008, Battleon Forums.
- Frank, Robert et. al, Principles of Economics, 2007, McGraw Hills, Australia.
- Wiktionary, Jerk, and Nerd.
- Wikipedia, Game Theory, Prisoner's Dilemma, Information Asymmetry and Coase Theorem
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